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ABSTRACT
Collusion with Private and Aggregate Information
by Jim Y. Jin*
This paper considers three linear asymmetric oligopoly models with (i) a representative
consumer, (ii) horizontal differentiation and (iii) vertical differentiation. We show that
firms could maximize the joint-profit only based on private and aggregate information.
They can choose the “correct“ colluding prices without knowing the demand or profit
function. The collusive outcome is a natural focal point despite firms are asymmetric.
Collusion can be incentive compatible even though individual actions (prices) are not
observed.
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Absprache durch private und gemeinschaftliche Information
Der Beitrag untersucht drei linear asymmetrische Oligopol-Modelle mit (i) einem
repräsentativen Verbraucher, (ii) horizontaler Differenzierung und (iii) vertikaler
Differenzierung. Es wird gezeigt, daß Firmen in der Lage sind, den Gesamtprofit allein
auf der Grundlage privater und gemeinschaftlicher Information zu maximieren. Sie
können zur „richtigen“ Absprache des Preises gelangen, ohne die Nachfrage- oder
Gewinn-Funktion zu kennen. Die Absprache stellt einen natürlichen Gleichgewichtspunkt
dar, ungeachtet asymmetrischer Verhältnisse. Die Absprache kann anreizkompatibel sein,
auch wenn individuelle Aktionen (Preise) nicht beobachtet werden.
                                               
*
 I thank R. Amir, H. Mewis, M. Tröge and B. Wernerfelt for their helpful comments. The
responsibility for remaining errors is solely mine.
1. Introduction
To achieve the joint-profit-maximization, firms should know how to choose appropriate
prices and have incentives to do so. This often requires (unrealistically) complete and
perfect information. This paper shows that, in three basic linear oligopoly models, firms
can maximize the joint-profit only based on private and aggregate information, much
less than one expects according to existing theories.
The difficulty to collude under imperfect information has been long realized. Stigler
(1964) argued that observing each other’s actions is essential for effective punishment.
Relying on perfect monitoring Friedman (1971) established the first rigorous collusion
equilibrium in a supergame. In Green and Porter (1984, tacit collusion with
unobservable actions (quantities) can only be achieved in a homogeneous Cournot
oligopoly, and is often interrupted by price wars.
Incomplete information also prevents firms from choosing ”correct” collusive prices
even if they want to do so. Lack of complete information often stems from the firm
heterogeneity, which alone makes collusion difficult. Asymmetric firms cannot easily
agree upon a focal point because the joint profit maximization may not divide the pie
fairly. As pointed out by Tirole (1988), collusion becomes more questionable when
firms "offer differentiated products (differentiated according to quality, location,
distribution channels, etc.). It is often felt that heterogeneity in both costs and products
may make coordination on a given price difficult" (p. 242).
Early collusion models normally assume homogeneous products and quantity
competition. The later extension into differentiated products with a representative
consumer includes Deneckere (1983), d'Aspremont et al (1983), Wernerfelt (1989) and
2Rothschild (1992). Furthermore, collusion with horizontally differentiated products was
examined by Albaek and Lambertini (1998), Chang (1991), Jehiel (1992) and Ross
(1992). These models are usually symmetric and do not focus on the difficulty of
collusion among asymmetric firms. Donsimoni (1985), Bae (1987) and Verboven (1997)
studied collusion with heterogeneous firms, yet under complete and perfect information.
An exception is Verboven’s (1998) horizontal differentiation model with three firms,
where two firms at ends cannot observe each other's quantities. In his model firms have
to soften their punishments, and thus are less likely to achieve perfect collusion.
Recently, in homogeneous Cournot oligopoly Rothschild (1999) showed that collusion is
likely hindered by asymmetric costs.
In the collusion literature firm asymmetry and incomplete/imperfect information are
usually not addressed simultaneously. The heterogeneity in product qualities and costs
make it difficult for firms to agree upon a focal point. In addition, if firms only know
their own product characteristics, they are usually unable to choose appropriate prices.
Moreover, if actions are unobservable, firms cannot effectively punish defection and
collusion becomes unsustainable. These difficulties all together seem too big and
complex for firms to overcome. A common sense would probably dismiss the real
possibility of perfect collusion by large.
It will be argued in this paper, that in three basic linear oligopoly models, firms can
maximize the joint-profit only based private and aggregate information. The three
asymmetric models with differentiated products are characterized by (i) a representative
consumer, (ii) horizontal differentiation, (iii) vertical differentiation. The private
information merely covers a firm’s product quality and cost, and the aggregate
information is about social welfare and consumer surplus only.
3The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we introduce three models.
Section 3 shows that, firms can chooses perfect collusive prices only based on private
information. The incentive compatibility given aggregate information is proved in section
4. Section 5 summarizes and discusses the policy implication.
2. Model
(i) Model I: Differentiated Products with a Representative Consumer:
This model extends those considered by Deneckere (1983), d'Aspremont et al (1983),
Donsimoni (1985), Bae (1987), Wernerfelt and Rothschild (1989) and Verboven (1997).
There are n firms. Each of them produces one good at a constant marginal cost in every
period. Firm i's price, output and marginal cost in period t are denoted by pit, xit, and cit.
Denote the price and output vectors by pt and xt. In addition to the n products, there is a
numeraire good x0t sold at a constant price normalized to 1.
A representative consumer has a utility function U
 t = x0t + atxt - 0.5xt'Btxt, where at is
an nu1 vector and Bt is a nun matrix. Both at and Bt vary in each period. Given the
price vector pt, her income wt and the budget constraint x0t + ptxt d wt, the
representative consumer chooses x0t and xt to maximize her utility. The utility is strictly
concave in xt, so Bt is positive definite. Its elements may have different signs as well as
different values, implying a mixture of substitute and complementary goods. Assume
that wt is sufficiently high in each period so that an interior solution for optimal
consumption always exists.
4No firm knows the entire utility function. Each firm i only knows ai, the marginal utility
of its product when no goods are sold. It depends only on the quality of the product, and
should be known by the producer. No firm knows anything about the Bt.
The first-order condition for utility maximization is pit - ait - jt
n
j ijtxb¦  1  = 0 for all i.
From this condition we get the demand function in price competition. Since Bt is
positive definite, its inverse B 1t  exists. Denote its element by Eijt, andthe elements of
B 1t atby Dit. We can write the demand function in price competition as:
xit(pt) = Dit - ¦  
n
j jtijt p1E (1)
Let cit be firm i’s constant marginal cost in period t, which varies over time, and is
known only by firm i. We assume that, in each period if all firms set prices equal to
their marginal costs, every firm can still sell something, i.e., xi(ct) > 0 for all i, where ct
is the n-firm cost vector. This assumption ensures that all firms are secured players. No
one can be driven out of the market by others, even if the other firms play minimax
strategies with marginal cost pricing.
We further assume ait > cit for all i and t. If this condition does not hold, firm i would be
unable to survive even if no other firm exists. Given the demand function (1) and its
marginal cost cit, firm i’s profit function in period t is (Dit - ¦  
n
j jtijt p1E )(pit - cit). The
joint profit in period t is:
St = ¦
i=1
n
 
[(Dit -¦  
n
j jtijt p1E )(pit - cit)]  (2)
5Except its own cost, no firm knows any parameter among Dit‘s and Eijt’s in (2). It seems
very unlikely for any firm to choose a joint-profit-maximizing price.
(ii) Model II: Horizontal Differentiation/A Star-City:
Hotelling's model with horizontal differentiation has been used in the collusion
literature by Albaek and Lambertini (1998), Chang (1991), Jehiel (1992) and Ross
(1992). Verboven (1998) extended their duopoly model to triopoly and assumed that
two firms at the ends do not observe each other’s actions. Our model further extends his
model to oligopoly. Instead of a straight line, we consider a star-city model as shown in
the graph.
Fig. 1 Star-City
Firm 1
                Firm 2
       Firm 0    Firm 3
    Firm 5
Firm 4
The city has a center and n straight roads stretching out continue into "countryside". A
shopping mall (firm 0) stands at the center and in each of the n roads stands a shopping
plazas (firm i = 1, … n) with a unit distance from the center. Consumers reside along n
roads with uniform density 1. In period t firm i offers its service with a quality vit which
6is known only by this firm. A consumer obtains such a utility vit purchasing its product,
and incurs a transportation cost W per unit of distance in addition to the price pit. She
chooses the product with the highest surplus provided it is positive. Otherwise she does
not buy. Different from the notation in the previous model, product x0t is offered by an
oligopoly firm, not a numeraire good. If all n + 1 firms sell something and all
consumers between the central mall and plazas purchase, we have the following
demand function:
x0t = 
W2
n (W + v0t - p0t) - ¦
i=1
n
 
(vit - pit)
2W , xit = W
W
2
p   v- 3p - 3v 0t0titit 
    (3)
Each firm i knows W and its cost cit which varies over time, but cit < vit. Similar to model
I, we want to make sure that every firm can sell something when all prices are equal to
marginal costs. To ensure this we assume that for all i and t:
_v0t - c0t - vit + cit_ < W (4)
To ensure that the joint-profit maximization yields an interior solution, we assume that
vit’s are sufficiently high comparing to costs such that
v0t + vit > 5W + c0t + ci t (5)
Given the demand function (3) and marginal costs, the total profit is:
St = 
(p0t-c0t)
2W [n(W + v0t - p0t)  - ¦i=1
n
 (vit - pit)] + ¦
i=1
n
 
(pit-cit)
2W (W + 3vit - 3pit - v0t + p0t) (6)
Knowing W, vit and cit only, firm i does not seem capable of setting the joint-profit
maximizing price even if it wants.
(iii) Model III: Vertically differentiated products:
7The model is based on Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) and Shaked and Sutton (1982).
To my knowledge, collusion with vertical differentiation has not been studied in the
literature. Here we extend the well-known vertically differentiated duopoly model to
oligopoly. There are n firms selling n products with different qualities and constant
marginal costs. They are ranked according to their distinct qualities. Let qit be firm i's
quality, which varies overtime and is known only by firm i. Without loss of generality,
we assume qi+1,t > qit for all i. An infinite number of consumers indexed by T are
uniformly distributed within [0,1]. Every consumer T chooses the highest Tqit – pit to
maximize her surplus by purchasing at most one product. No purchase occurs if the
surplus is negative. When every firm sells something, we have:
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 for 1 < i < n (7)
Firms’ marginal costs depend on qualities according to a function c(q), which is
unknown to firms. However, the function satisfies the following properties:
c(0) = 0, c'(q) > 0, c"(q) > 0
cit < qit, qit - cit < qi+1t - ci+1t (8)
This first row is the standard assumption. If the inequality in the second row is violated,
firm i cannot sell anything unless it incurs a loss. The right inequality is necessary to
ensure that every firm can sell something under marginal cost pricing. If it is violated,
no one buys from firm i + 1 when pit = cit. Given the demand function (7), the total
profit in period t is:
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Knowing only qit and cit, setting a joint-profit maximizing price seems unlikely. In all
three oligopoly models, we assume that for every firm i: ¦
f
 tk G
tk
i
 ES cik ) > E(S dit ) +
¦
f
 1tk G
tk
i
 ES nik ), where ES cik ) is firm i’s expected collusive profit, E(S dit ) is its
expected defecting payoff, ES nik ) is the expected payoff when firms play a non-
cooperative game in period k, Gi is firm i's discount factor. This assumption ensures that
if information is perfect and complete, every firm prefers collusion to defection. Thus,
we can focus on three problems: how to find (a) collusive prices, (b) an agreeable focal
point and (c) defection behavior, given very limited information.
Besides the private information about firms’ own product characteristics above, we
allow only aggregate information available for firms. However, any aggregate
information must come from collection of private information. We assume that there is
a public institute collecting all information firms have, i.e., at, ct in model I, vt, ct and W
in model II, and qt and ct in model III. Every firm must know its own price and output,
so the institute also collects pt and xt in each period.
No firm’s individual data or its behavior will be observed by rivals. The institute can
only reveal aggregate information such as social welfare and consumer surplus, based
on the information it collects from firms. Since the aggregate information does not
reveal any firm’s individual behavior, it seems unlikely that firms can use it to detect
any defection and monitor collusion effectively.
93. Pricing
Although maximizing the joint-profit looks very difficult given our assumptions, the
solution is actually quite simple.
Proposition 1: In oligopoly models I – III, the joint-profit maximizing prices are:
pcit = 0.5(ait + cit) (10)
pc0t = 0.5(v0t + c0t) + W pcit = 0.5(vit + cit + W)  
(11)
pcit = 0.5(qit + cit)  (12)
Proof: see Appendix A.
A major challenge for asymmetric firms to collude is how to find a focal point. The
price strategies (10) – (12) offer a plausible solution for the following reasons.
1. Pareto efficient: The total profit is maximized ex post.
2. Easy to implement: Strategies (10) - (12) require very limited information.
3. Rationally irrational: The strategies are very close to the monopoly prices when no
other firm exists. In model I, firm i’s monopoly demand function is (ait - pit)/bii, and its
monopoly price would be 0.5(ait + cit), identical to (10). In model II, firm 0’s monopoly
demand function is n(v0t - p0t)/W, and the monopoly price is 0.5(v0t + c0t), less than (11)
by W/2. Any other firm i’s monopoly demand function is 2(vit - pit)/W, if pit t vit - W, and
n(vit - pit)/W - n + 2 otherwise. Conditions (4) and (5) imply vit > cit + 2W, and hence the
optimal price would be 0.5(vit + cit + W) – W/n, less than (11) by W/n. In model III, firm’s
10
monopoly demand function is 1 - pit/qit, and the monopoly price would be 0.5(qit + cit),
identical to (12).
4. Proportional reduction: The outcome requires "fair" sacrifice because every firm's
output falls to the half of its output level when all prices are set equal to marginal costs.
Substituting strategy (10) into the demand function (1), we get collusive output xt(p ct ) =
B 1t (at - 0.5(atct  B 1t (at - ct xt(ct). Similarly, plugging (11), (12) into (4),
(7) respectively, every firm’s output is exactly the half of xit (ct). Therefore, under the
joint-profit maximization every firm retains exactly its market share when all firms try
to maximize their market shares.
5. Justifiable territory: Suppose that all firms except firm i set prices equal to marginal
costs, firm i’s optimal price should be the mid-point between its marginal cost and the
zero-quantity price. Then, its output must be exactly the half of its marginal cost pricing
output, which is just the collusive one. Hence, every firm’s quantity under the joint-
profit maximization is equal to its optimal output given other firms’ minmax strategies.
This territory is fully justified by its strength to defend it.
6. Fair rewards: Given the quantity allocation, the distribution of profit is determined
by firms’ profit margins. The collusive profit margins completely depend on firms' own
characteristics. In model I, pit - cit = 0.5(ait - cit). In model II, this value is 0.5(vit - cit) +
W for i = 0, and + 0.5W otherwise. In model III, it is 0.5(qit - cit). All firms earn collusive
profits according to own merits, not free riding on others.
Schmalensee (1987) discussed four possible collusion schemes: The first, a side
payment, is illegal; the second, constant market shares, is difficult to maintain under
uncertainty; the third, market division is often not practical due to arbitrage. The last,
11
equal proportional reduction in outputs, fits our results quite well. Regarding the
proportional reduction in quantity competition, Schmalensee pointed out that, "when
cost differ, however, this point has no special attraction" (357) since it does not
maximize the joint profit. Also, it is not achievable in quantity competition with limited
information. In our three models of price competition, the ”proportional reduction” has
obvious advantages and attractions to be the focal point.
7. The last reason is easy monitoring, which will be examined in the next section.
4. Monitoring
As we assumed earlier, a public institute collects information about ct, pt and xt in each
period, also, at in model I, vt and W in model II, and qt in model III. Given this
information, the institute can calculate social welfare and consumer surplus. In model I,
for instance, as pt = at - Btxt, social welfare atxt - 0.5xtBtxt = (0.5at + 0.5pt - ct)xt,
consumer surplus atxt - 0.5xtBtxt - ptxt = 0.5(at - pt)xt. we allow the trade association to
access the aggregate information such as social welfare and consumer surplus.
Then, monitoring goes as follows. In every period, if social welfare is equal to three
times of consumer surplus in model I and III, or plus nW in model II, collusion
continues; if the equality does not holds, collusion stops immediately and firms play a
non-cooperative game forever. We will prove that, if all firms follow (10) - (12), the
collusion condition holds; whenever any price is lower than (10) – (12), the condition
breaks down. We rule out any deviation with prices higher than the joint-profit
maximization level, because it does not make sense. As we assumed that every firm is
worse off in a non-cooperative game, colluding is incentive compatible.
12
Proposition 2: The joint-profit maximization is incentive compatible if collusion stops
whenever SW = 3CS (+ nW) breaks down in model I, III (II).
Proof: see Appendix B.
Every economic model is fictional somehow. We do not argue that the information
assumed here is always available in a real market, and firms do collude in this way. The
paper nevertheless points such a possibility that seemingly impossible collusion can be
achieved with only private and aggregate information. On the other hand, our result
reveals that, social welfare is close to 3 times of consumer surplus under perfect
collusion. Such an observation can be used by antitrust authorities to identify collusive
behavior. Since this relation holds under perfect collusion regardless of how it is
achieved, checking such a relation might be useful for antitrust authorities.
5. Conclusion
This paper shows the possibility of joint-profit maximization with only private and
aggregated information. We studied three commonly used oligopoly models with
product differentiation. The perfect collusion described in the paper is surely not robust
for various modifications. However, based on the similar principle firms may design
more practical mechanisms to achieve collusive outcomes. One should notice that,
perfect collusion does not occur only in the cases we just saw. Given different market
structures, we can give examples where other types of information can also lead to
similar outcomes. The purpose of the paper is to show that even with very limited
information perfect collusion is not so unthinkable as we thought. The particular point
of this model is to demonstrate how aggregate information can be collusion conducive.
13
The studies on collusion have mainly focused on the potential dangers of individual
firm-specific information. Antitrust policy rarely concerns with the availability of
aggregate information. This paper sends a warning signal.
14
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Appendix A:
In model I, the total profit, (pt-ct)B-1(at-pt), is strictly concave in pt, hence reaches its
maximum if the first-order condition B-1(at+ct) - 2B-1pt = 0 holds. The solution is pt =
0.5(at+ct) i.e., (10). Since ait > cit and xi(ct) > 0, every firm i makes a positive profit.
In model II, the first-order condition to maximize (6) is: n(W + v0t - 2p0t + c0t) + ¦
i=1
n
 (2pit
- vit - cit) = 0 and 2p0t - v0t - c0t + W + 3vit - 6pit + 3cit = 0, for i > 0. It is easy to verify
that they are satisfied under (11).
The second-order derivatives are: w²S/wp 20  = -3/W, w²S/wp
2
i  = -n/W for i > 0, w²S/wpiwp0 =
1/W, w²S/wpiwpj = 0 for i, j z 0 and i z j. As the sum of every row of matrix w²S/wp² is
negative, it has a dominant diagonal, and must be negative definite (McKenzie 1960,
Theorem 2). Thus S is strictly concave, (11) leads to the unique maximum.
Substituting (11) into (3), we get x c0t = 0.25[n(W + v0t - c0t) - ¦
i=1
n
 (vit-cit)]/W, and xcit =
0.25(W + 3vit - 3cit - v0t + c0t)/W for i > 0. They are positive given (4), and equal to the
half of those under marginal cost pricing.
Furthermore, we must show that (3) is indeed valid. First, no firm is being undercut by
its neighbors. This requires _v0t - pc0t - vit + pcit_ < W, for i > 0. Further, (11) implies that
_v0t - c0t - vit + cit - W_ < 2W, which is guaranteed by (5). Secondly, the “indifferent”
consumers between firm 0 and any firm i must have positive surplus, i.e., v0t - pc0t - TW >
0, where T = (v0t - pc0t - vit - pcit)/2W. This is guaranteed by (5).
In model III, (12) satisfies the first-order condition to maximize (8):
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The second-order derivatives are: w²S/wp 21  = -2q2t/q1t(q2t-q1t), w²S/wp 2n  = -2/(qnt-qn-1t),
w²S/wp 2i  = -2/(qi+1t-qit) - 2/(qit-qi-1t) for i z 1, n, w²S/wpiwpi+1 = 2/(qi+1t-qit), w²S/wpiwpj = 0
for all _i - j_ > 1. Similar to model II, the sum of the first row of w²S/wp² is negative, and
the rest is zero. Then, this matrix has a quasi-dominant diagonal and is negative definite
(McKenzie 1960, Theorem 2). So the first-order condition guarantees the joint-profit
maximization.
We need to show that (7) is valid. Substituting (12), we get firms' outputs:
xc1t =  0.5(
tt
tt
qq
cc
12
12


 - 
t
t
q
c
1
1 ) xcnt =  0.5(1 - 
tnnt
tnnt
qq
cc
1
1



 )
xcit =  0.5(
itti
itti
qq
cc




1
1
 - 
tiit
tiit
qq
cc
1
1



 ) for i z 1, n
As c"(q) > 0, c(q) is convex. Given any O(0,1), c[Oqi-1,t + (1-O)qi+1,t] < Oc(qi-1,t) + (1-
O)c(qi+1,t). Let O = (qi+1,t-qit)/(qi+1,t-qi-1,t), we get (qit - qi-1,t)ci+1,t + (qi+1,t - qit)ci-1,t > (qi+1,t -
qi-1,t)cit. This implies xcit > 0 for all i z 1, n. Further, x1t > 0 if q1tc2t > q2tc1t. This holds if
c(q)/q increases in q. Then, it suffices to show qc’(q) – c(q) is positive. Since c(0) = 0
and c”(q) > 0, this function increases in q and equals zero when q = 0. Hence, it must be
positive for any q > 0. Moreover, qnt - cnt > qn-1t - cn-1t ensures xnt > 0. Thus, all
quantities are positive.
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Finally, the buyers with the lowest T’s for each product must obtain positive surplus.
For firm 1, T = q1t/p1t, the surplus is positive if (q1t)²/p1t - p1t > 0, i.e., q1t > pc1t. This is
guaranteed by q1t > c1t. For i > 1, T = (pit - pi-1t)/(qit - qi-1t). We need (pit - pi-1t)qit > pit(qit
- qi-1t). Under (12), this holds if c(q)/q rises in q, which we just showed above.
Appendix B:
In model I, we define a function Lt as SWt - 3CS t = (2pt - at - ct)B 1t (at - pt). It is easy
to verify that, Lt(p ct ) = 0, wLt(p ct )/wp = x(ct), and w²L/wp² = -4B 1t . The second-order
Taylor expansion of Lt around p
c
t  is x(ct)' pt - 2'pt' B 1t 'pt. Since x(ct) > 0, B 1t  is
positive definite,  Hence, Lt < 0 for any 'pt < 0. We rule out any deviation with prices
higher than p ct , because this should never occur.
In model II, we define Lt as SWt - 3CS t - nW = xt'(pt-ct) - xt'(wx/wp)-1xt. In model III, Lt
= SWt - 3CS t = xt'(pt-ct) - xt'(wx/wp)-1xt. Similarly to model I, we have Lt(p ct ) = 0,
wLt(p ct )/wp = x(ct), and w²L/wp² = 4wx/wp. In the two cases, we also have Lt = x(ct)' pt +
2'pt'(wx/wp)'pt for any deviation of 'pt. Hence Lt < 0 if 'pt < 0.
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